Abtracts
Too many windows on Russia? Foreign Trade Policy and Economic Thought in Russia in the Eighteenth Century
'Reval and particularly Riga seemed well suited to turn into the new capital of Russia … but when Reval and Riga became Russian cities, the city of St Petersburg existed already for seven years, and Peter had already spent so much money, put so much work in it... that it was already too late to think of another place for the new capital.'
Vissarion Belinskii's notion seems rather strange from a modern perspective since Tallinn and Riga are themselves capitals of independent states outside Russia. But considering the circumstances during the early years of the Great Northern War, the idea of Riga or Reval as the new capital of Russia was certainly possible and arguably thinkable, especially when one considers that access to the Baltic Sea was a major consideration for the tsar's waging of the war in the first place. Indeed it is worth considering whether the well-established port cities of Riga and Reval could have served better as 'windows on Europe' than Peter's plans for a new city, since they had already fulfilled this role for centuries. St Petersburg, on the other hand, had to be constructed with enormous efforts in a region that was by no means more 'Russian' in terms of its indigenous population than other parts of the newly conquered Baltic littoral. However, as Belinskii suggested, the decision had already been taken and St Petersburg subsequently became the largest port city in the Baltic Sea over the course of the eighteenth century.
Nevertheless there is a lingering question about the possible competition that existed between the 'old' and the 'new' Baltic port towns in Russia after the foundation of St Petersburg. This relationship can be examined through a study of the policies that influenced the development of their respective shares in Russian foreign trade markets. This analysis can be considered through a threefold division of influences on policy. Firstly, in a centralized and absolute monarchy like Russia, the tsar and the government played a vital role in stipulating and attempting to enforce such policies. Secondly, however, one should consider the resistance or intransigence of local merchants, especially in Riga but also those from Archangel'sk or Reval. Finally, foreign trade typically influenced Russian developments as well. In the case of Russian foreign trade during the eighteenth century, this can be attributed to the British, Dutch and in part also north German merchants, who took a very active role in the Russian trade.
Evaluating the aims and objectives of these groups and their leading figures requires some consideration of the ideas and practices that they intended to apply in Russia. As a result, these policies must be contextualised in the framework of contemporary economic thought. This is undoubtedly a challenge, since the academic discipline of 'economics' was not clearly established in Russia before the early nineteenth century, at the University of Moscow.
The question therefore becomes about the sources of economic thought in (and about) Russia prior to that date? This enquiry is further complicated by the fact that other scientific disciplines were only gradually evolving in this period, only later to become established after what has been described as 'the age of Enlightenment'. This is particularly true of economic thinking, bearing in mind that the term 'экономика' was not a well-defined term in this period. As a consequence, essentially, this endeavour is an analysis of economic thinking avant la lettre.
Especially in the first half of the eighteenth century, economic treatises were a rare phenomenon, with the famous exception of Ivan T. Pososhkov's 'Кинга о скудости и богатстве' (1724, albeit unpublished), which holds somewhat mercantile views on trade issues that in turn corresponded to an extent with contemporary Russian governmental policy on foreign trade. Later in the century, there were several works by members of the Academy of Science and the Free Economic Society, which were heavily influenced by German scholars like Heinrich von Storch or Wilhelm Christian Friebe. Finally there were treatises written by employees of the College of Commerce or the Customs authorities, such as Aleksandr N. Radishchev and Mikhail D. Chulkov.
When comparing the envisioned objectives and the applied measures (drawing upon their respective theories) with the eventual outcome, it is possible to discern specific features of Russian foreign trade policy during the eighteenth century. Firstly, to a certain extent, there was a shift away from the aforementioned somewhat mercantile views and policies toward a more open trade policy influenced by the ideas of thinkers such as Adam Smith. Secondly, and this shift in economic thinking notwithstanding, three goals were constantly pursued: 1) a centralisation of trade routes, which helps to explain the success of St Petersburg versus its rivals as the leading port city; 2) the broader aim of general economic growth, which never lost its importance; 3) the foundation of a Russian merchant fleet, which consistently dominated the discourse about trade issues during the eighteenth century.
While deregulating measures of the economic policy, the first two objectives were accomplished with growing success, whereas the establishment of a Russian merchant fleet was never fully achieved, no matter what kind of economic thinking was dominant. The reasons for this failure may be interpreted as a mixture of the refusal of the government to mobilize inner social resources and to incite social engineering on the one hand and a failure to overcome foreign dominance in the financial sector on the other hand.
To sum up, the strategic position of Russian foreign trade policy in this period can be characterized as follows. At the central level, the government found itself caught in a paradoxical deadlock or dilemma. While Russian economic thinking and economic policy generally followed the European transition from mercantilism towards liberal classical economics, both principles had their respective drawbacks. While the Russian version of mercantile policy only achieved a surplus of overall trade rates, it always followed the non-mercantile pattern of exporting only raw materials and importing luxury goods. Also the alleged liberalisation of trade policies never overcame the general absolutist character of Russian policymaking under successive rulers, including Catherine II. Hence the Russian attempt to gain profits by participating in a global trade systems which was shifting from mercantilism toward 'free trade' can be described as a mixture between internal colonization (of Russian raw materials) and external colonization (by foreign dominance in foreign trade relations). The latter was already described by the early Soviet Pokrovskii School, which characterised Russia as a semi-colony of Great Britain during the eighteenth century.
Accordingly, at the global level, the position of Russian trade policy within global markets was characterised by the ambivalence of the access to the Baltic Sea. If, on the one hand, the Baltic Sea served as an important conduit for participation in world trade, at the same time, on the other hand, it served also as a barrier dermarcating a clear hierarchy in trade relations between Russia and 'the West'. Finally, at the local level, Russian trade routes centered strongly on St Petersburg. Assessing this process on exclusively economic grounds, the interpretation of St Petersburg as a grandiose mistake is understandable since constructing the city and supplying it did not agree with purely economic reasoning. As a result, there were certainly sufficient 'windows on Russia' during this period and, arguably, they could have been used more effectively in terms of economically modernising Russia in the eighteenth century than St Petersburg.
- Tilman Plath, Ernst Moritz Arndt Universität Greifswald
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