Abstracts
The Strategies of Peter I and his Envoy in Vienna, Johann Christoph von Urbich, after the battle of Poltava (1709)
The question that arises in the context of the political and diplomatic strategies during the reign of Tsar Peter I is that of the beginning of a European conception, in other words: the beginning of the ‘Europeanisation’ of Russian international politics. Research paints a largely uniform picture, namely that Peter I was looking for short-term, military alliances during the Great Northern War. It was only towards the end of the war, in the course of the peace negotiations, that a European conception of his political strategies was developed.
But the analysis of additional sources shows that such a conception can be traced back to 1707, in the crisis caused by the Altranstädt peace agreement, rather than only in the later stages of the Great Northern War. At this earlier stage, Peter I was not only seeking military allies, but wanted to enter into a long-term alliance with European powers to secure a future peace. Subsequently the powerful military position achieved in 1709 not only enabled a different negotiating position, but also offered the opportunity to develop his own political conception. The looming loss of Swedish supremacy in the Baltic Sea region opened up opportunities for a reorganisation of the European power constellation.
In the summer of 1707 Peter I started various diplomatic initiatives at the Imperial court in Vienna through his newly-accredited envoy Johann Christoph von Urbich. He hoped that Urbich would succeed in establishing an anti-Swedish alliance by offering an exclusive exchange of intelligence and troops for the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I (1705-1711) in the war against France. In addition to this rather short-term strategy of gaining the Emperor as an ally, there were also longer-term strategies pursued by Peter I. These included the initiative to gain political influence through dynastic connections to German princes. Another plan, detailed in a letter from Urbich to Peter I in October 1709, was the attempt to establish a seat in the Imperial Diet in Ratisbon for the tsar – and thus de facto to achieve Sweden’s status in the Holy Roman Empire. The initiative was part of the joint strategic considerations between several Catholic prince-bishops, some representatives of the Teutonic Order, and the Russian envoy to banish the King of Sweden from the Holy Roman Empire. The Catholic interest in the expulsion of Charles XII was related to the fact that the King of Sweden was a guarantor to Protestants in accordance to the Peace of Westphalia. It was proposed that the tsar would support the restitution of the province of Livonia, both as a territory of the Teutonic Order and as a territory of the Holy Roman Empire. Urbich demanded in return the incorporation of the province of Ingria into the Holy Roman Empire and its elevation to an electorate under the tsar.
These considerations can be regarded as pure mind games, but the two basic ideas – a seat in the Imperial Diet for the Tsar and the restitution of Livonia to the Holy Roman Empire – were pursued in other variations. The idea of a Russian imperial estate may have originated with Urbich, but after the conquests in the Baltic region and the associated push back of Sweden, this idea was actively pursued by Peter I. It carried with it the possibility of the Russian state serving as on the guarantors of a new European power constellation.
The tsar not only offered military support to the Holy Roman Emperor, but also concrete political support – as an ally in the negotiations at Utrecht between 1713 and 1715. The base element of this offer was a far-reaching alliance, a joint arrangement for mutual diplomatic support not only in the peace negotiations in Utrecht, but also in future peace negotiations in the Northern conflict. Both peace agreements were intended as part of a comprehensive peace system under a de facto Russian-Imperial guarantee. This plan, offered on behalf of the tsar by Urbich at the Imperial Court in May 1712, had the potential for a general redistribution of the Swedish fiefs within the Holy Roman Empire under the aegis of Peter I. The orientation towards the Peace of Westphalia is easy to determine when the Russian envoy called for the peace negotiations of the two great wars to be merged into a ‘permanent peace’. The reorganisation within the Holy Roman Empire would accompany the replacement of Sweden by Russia as one of the Imperial guarantors.
A response to this idea can be found in the notes prepared by Imperial diplomats run advance of an audience with the new Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI (1711-1740). The rejection concentrated on what the Russian side expected in return: such a recognition of Russian conquests and granting it a seat in the Imperial Diet would dissolve the internal balance of power of the Holy Roman Empire.
The insistence on the status quo recommended by the imperial diplomats in 1712 could not stop the political developments arising from the momentum of the Great Northern War. The reduction of the influence of Sweden in the Holy Roman Empire facilitated the rise of Prussia, while Russia was able to establish itself as a significant force within the European power structure in the aftermath of the Treaty of Nystad.
– Regina Stuber, Julius-Maximilians-Universität Wurzburg
An expanded German version will be included in a monograph as part of “Multiple und transterritoriale Loyalitätsbindungen als Strukturelement der diplomatischen Praxis um 1700: Johann Christoph von Urbich (1653-1715) im Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen dem Heiligen Römischen Reich, Dänemark und Russland”, a project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/416436858
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